




Other Claims for Moneyt
I. Introduction
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS
When drafting international loan agreements, lenders usually do not
introduce into negotiations with borrowers the subject of prejudgment
attachments for which lenders might eventually have to file in order to
secure payment of principal and interest. Prejudgment attachments are
designed to be instruments of a surprise attack launched against the bor-
rower. For this reason loan agreements normally do not expressly mention
such attachments. One must assume that lenders, when drafting their
agreements, do not even contemplate the necessity that they might be
compelled to file for prejudgment attachments.
In fact, prejudgment attachments have been very rare in the field of
international loans. The few cases in which such orders have been sought
and granted cannot, however, be explained by certain clauses incorpo-
rated into almost all international loan agreements to preserve equality
between creditors. Negative pledges' maintain the equal footing of all
creditors by restricting the borrower from voluntarily and unilaterally
granting special security interests in favor of certain creditors and to the
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exclusion of others. The clause does not prevent the creditor himself from
seeking a preferential enjoyment of security interests conferred by an
order of court, even if the equal ranking among all creditors is thereby
disturbed. Likewise, pari-passu clauses 2 oblige borrowers merely to re-
frain from granting certain creditors privileged positions as to the satis-
faction of their claims for principal and interest; nothing in these clauses
forestalls creditors from seeking attachment orders by which they obtain
preferential security interests. Finally, sharing clauses, 3 in syndicated
loans hardly preclude creditors from applying for prejudgment attach-
ments, for such clauses merely guarantee the enjoyment of equal benefits
as between the members of a syndicate; if one of their number is able to
obtain a security interest, this will benefit all of them, including the
applicant.
The mechanisms of negative pledges, pari-passu clauses, and sharing
clauses are not designed to alleviate the need for prejudgment attach-
ments. That such attachments have been sought and granted in a few
instances only seems to be attributable to the fact that borrowers of
international loans, once insolvent, have usually been able to negotiate
for more time with their creditors. Lenders have thereby escaped resort
to judicial action to secure the payment of principal and interest.
B. INCIDENCES IN WHICH COURTS HAVE
ORDERED PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENTS
Courts have occasionally issued prejudgment attachments in favor of
creditors in international loans. Those incidences illustrate the types of
situations in which creditors might be tempted to seek injunctive relief
by prejudgment attachments. Two of such incidences should be mentioned
in the present context.
In the mid-seventies, under the rule of the Shah, the Government
of Iran had received from a number of U.S. American, Canadian, and
Swiss banks a series of syndicated loans. The borrower agreed to pay
interest on these loans to the agents of the creditors in New York
City. On November 6, 1979, in response to the taking of the personnel
of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran as hostages, President Carter seized
all the deposits of the Iranian state with U.S. American banks. The
Iranian State was thereafter unable to pay in New York City, as
stipulated, the interest due on the loans. The lenders thereupon declared
all the loans immediately due and payable. To secure the payment of
principal and interest some U.S. American banks filed motions in
2. See P. WooD, supra note 1, at 155-57.
3. See Walker & Buchheit, supra note 1.
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German courts for prejudgment attachments. The German courts granted
those motions and the shares owned by the government of Iran in
some important German corporations were provisionally seized. 4 In
extraordinary situations, therefore, notably under the impact of wholly
unexpected political events or governmental actions, prejudgment at-
tachments can be a valuable means to secure the claims of creditors
of international loans.
A second incidence demonstrates that prejudgment attachments may
be useful to an international loan creditor even under less dramatic
circumstances. 5 In 1980 a corporation domiciled outside of the U.S.
had issued two batches of promissory notes that a state agency of
the borrowing corporation had guaranteed. Some of these notes were
acquired by a New York bank. In April 1982 an installment of interest
on one batch of notes became due and the other batch of notes was
due for repayment; nevertheless, several telexes of the New York
lender to the foreign borrower and to the state guarantor remained
unanswered. The uncertainty continued for several months while the
New York lender (and other New York lenders who held other prom-
issory notes of the same batches that also had not been honored)
further attempted to collect the sums outstanding. At last, the lender,
upon motion to a New York court, was granted a secret order to
attach some of the New York assets of the foreign state agency. In
January 1983 sheriffs delivered copies of the attachment order to more
than twenty multinational banks in New York. The effect of this move
was overwhelming. The bad publicity, the embarrassment, and the
pressure brought by the refusal of large creditor banks to finance other
short-term debts of the guarantor state agency caused the borrower
to pay not only the balance due on the promissory notes held by the
New York lender, but also all principal and interest on the other
promissory notes held by other New York banks.
Prejudgment attachments thus can be powerful instruments of con-
straint on borrowers who are caught in the extraordinary turmoil of
political events, governmental restraints, or in other unusual situations.
They can likewise provide a means to attack borrowers who just do
not care, for one reason or another, about the timely payment of their
debts.
4. For a rather slick report of this incidence that to the author's knowledge has not been
reported elsewhere see J. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S MOST POWERFUL
LAW FIRMS 27-53 (1983); see also R. ASSERSOHN, THE BIGGEST DEAL: BANKERS, POLITICS,
AND THE HOSTAGES OF IRAN 95 (1982).
5. See Brown, How To Be Paid in a Defaulting Loan, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1983, at
10-12.
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C. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE
I. Comparative Survey on the Most
Important Jurisdictions with
Respect to Prejudgment Attachments
First the article explores whether and to what extent the most
important jurisdictions of the international business community provide
a legal mechanism whereby a lender may attach property of a borrower
before the lender obtains a final or provisional judgment against the
borrower. Within the framework of that research this article clarifies
which preconditions the lender would have to meet to petition suc-
cessfully for prejudgment attachment of assets of the borrower. This
research necessitates a comparative survey of the most important
jurisdictions of the international business community with respect to
prejudgment attachments. Particular attention is devoted, in this con-
text, to questions of jurisdiction and venue: Do the different national
legal systems require a court with which a petition for an attachment
order has been filed to have jurisdiction not only over the assets
situated within the territorial boundaries of such court but also over
the subject-matter, in the eventuality that the lender institutes an
action against the borrower for the payment of the principal and the
interest?
2. The Drafting of an Appropriate
Forum Selection Clause
With the background of such a comparative survey the article next
addresses (i) whether the forum selection clauses currently in use be-
tween international lenders and borrowers satisfy the requirements es-
tablished in the different national legal systems for the successful intro-
duction of petitions for prejudgment attachments, or (ii) whether and to
what extent the wording of such clauses could be ameliorated in order
to facilitate the successful filing for prejudgment attachments. Included
is counsel for those who draft international loan agreements. This section
also examines whether it is advisable to incorporate into international
loan agreements special clauses dealing with eventual motions for pre-
judgment attachments.
3. Modifications Caused by
Foreign States as Borrowers
Finally, the article deals with the question whether the proposed
forum selection clauses need to be modified when the borrower is a
sovereign state. Delicate questions of state immunity are discussed in
that context.
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II. A Comparative Survey of the Most
Important Jurisdictions with
Respect to Prejudgment Attachments6
Most international loan agreements are governed either by New York
or by English law. Many international borrowers hold deposits either with
New York banks or with English banks in London. The comparative
survey over the different national regulations concerning prejudgment
attachments begins, therefore, with the most important Anglo-American
law jurisdictions: New York and England.
A. ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW JURISDICTIONS
The New York regulations on prejudgment attachments are represen-
tative for the regulations in effect in the other common law states of the
United States. English law will serve also as an illustration of the law
prevailing in other common law countries of the British Commonwealth.
i. Prejudgment Attachments
according to New York Law
a. The Statutory Framework
Attachments are the subject of article 62 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules. It follows from the plain language of section
6201, paragraphs (1) through (3),7 that an international lender could move
for a prejudgment attachment against the assets of a borrower if (1) the
borrower is a nondomiciliary of New York, or a foreign corporation not
qualified to do business in New York; (2) the (eventually foreign) bor-
6. See three other surveys: Delaume, Provisional Measures: Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
and Attachment, in TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES, PART III: JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT; How to Gain Prejudgment Attachment, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1983, at 29-40; Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) and Government of Indonesia, [1977] 3 All E.R. 324,
331-32 (C.A.) (Lord Denning).
7. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 6201 (McKinney 1980) reads:
An order of attachment may be granted in any action, except a matrimonial action,
where the plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in
the alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants, when:
1. the defendant is a nondomiciliary residing without the state, or is a foreign
corporation not qualified to do business in the state; or
2. the defendant resides or is domiciled in the state and cannot be personally
served despite diligent efforts to do so; or
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement
of a judgment that might be rendered in plaintiff's favor, has assigned, disposed
of, encumbered or secreted property, or removed it from the state or is about to
do any of these acts; or
4. [This paragraph deals with postjudgment attachments.]
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rower resides and is domiciled in New York, but cannot be personally
served in New York despite diligent efforts to do so; or (3) the borrower,
with intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate the enforcement of a
judgment that might be rendered in the lender's favor, has assigned,
disposed of, encumbered, or secreted property, or removed it from the
state or is about to do any of these acts. Section 6211(a) provides that
an order of attachment may be granted without notice, before or after
service of summons and at any time prior to judgment. The order of
attachment shall be directed to the sheriff of any county or of the city
of New York where any property in which the defendant has an interest
is located or where a garnishee may be served. The order shall direct
the sheriff to levy within his jurisdiction, at any time before final judg-
ment, upon such property in which the defendant has an interest and
upon such debts owing to the defendant as will satisfy the amount
specified in the order of attachment.
Note, however, that by virtue of section 6211(b) an order of attach-
ment granted without notice shall provide that within a period not to
exceed five days after levy, the plaintiff shall move for an order con-
firming the order of attachment. If the plaintiff fails to make such motion
within the required period, the order of attachment and any levy there-
under shall have no further effect and shall be vacated upon motion.
Section 6213 further provides that an order of attachment granted before
an action is commenced is valid only if, within sixty days after the
order is granted, a summons is served upon the defendant or first pub-
lication of the summons against the defendant is made pursuant to an
order and publication is subsequently completed. Finally, by virtue of
section 6223, an attachment may be vacated upon motion of the de-
fendant if the defendant can show that the attachment is unnecessary
for the security of plaintiff.8
Two aspects of the statutory framework of sections 6201, 6211, and
6213 need further clarification. First, the question arises of which juris-
dictional requirements must be met before a court can issue an order of
attachment against the property of a person domiciled either within or
without the state of New York. In the field of international loans this
question is tantamount to the problem of the in rem jurisdiction of a New
York court over a domestic or foreign borrower. Following on this ques-
tion is whether New York courts, in such cases, also need to have juris-
diction over the subject matter of the claim (the payment of the principal
and interest) that the prejudgment attachment is designed to secure.
8. Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
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b. In Rem Jurisdiction over the
New York Assets of a Borrower
When a domestic or foreign lender applies to a New York court for an
order of a prejudgment attachment upon the assets of a domiciliary of
New York no problem of jurisdiction arises. The New York courts will
be vested with in personam jurisdiction over such borrower by virtue of
the New York domicile of the latter. Section 6201, paragraphs (2) and (3)
only prescribe a showing by the lender that drastic action is required for
security purposes. 9 Jurisdiction is of no importance here.
The jurisdictional question differs, however, insofar as a lender seeks
to obtain a prejudgment attachment with respect to the New York assets
of a nondomiciliary of New York, be it the assets of a foreign state or
those of a foreign corporation. Over those entities, New York courts
cannot exercise personal jurisdiction unless special circumstances, for
example, doing business in New York, have established closer ties with
New York. In the absence of that kind of special circumstance a lender
could base his motion before a New York court for prejudgment attach-
ment over the assets of his foreign borrower only upon in rem jurisdiction.
Section 6201, paragraph (1) of the New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules provides that an order of attachment may also be granted when the
defendant is a nondomiciliary residing without New York or when it is a
foreign corporation not qualified to do business in New York. This pro-
vision might lead to the conclusion that the presence of tangible or in-
tangible property alone in any county or in the city of New York would
suffice to create in rem jurisdiction over a foreign respondent. This con-
clusion would, however, be wrong.
Important consitutional limitations have been placed upon statutory
provisions such as section 6201, paragraph (1) of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules. In Shaffer v. Heitner1 ° the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the constitutional standards established in its International Shoe
decision' I for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction must also be applied
to the exercise of in rem jurisdiction. The presence of property alone will
not support a state's jurisdiction over the owner of the property. The due
process clause requires other ties to exist between the defendant, the
state, and the litigation. If the property attached is wholly unrelated to
the underlying cause of action, there can be no in rem jurisdiction over
that property. 12
9. See Incontrade Inc. v. Oilborn Int'l S.A., 407 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
10. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). An abundance of literature discusses this decision. See, e.g.,
Smit, The Importance of Shaffer v. Heitner: Seminal or Minimal?, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV.
519-32 (1979) and the references therein.
I1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12. 433 U.S. at 210.
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The Supreme Court pointed out in Shaffer v. Heitner, however, that
the primary rationale for treating the presence of property as a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction to adjudicate claims over which a state would not
have jurisdiction if only the in personam doctrine of International Shoe
applied would be that a wrongdoer "should not be able to avoid payment
of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a place where
he is not subject to an in personam suit."' 13 This justification would "at
most" suggest that a state in which property is located should have ju-
risdiction to attach that property as security for a judgment being sought
in a forum where the litigation could be maintained consistently with
International Shoe. The Supreme Court thus indicates that a court may
be permitted to exercise in rem jurisdiction over a foreign borrower who
seeks to avoid execution of its property for nonpayment of debts by
removing its assets into the territory of a foreign state.
Later decisions of U.S. federal courts have strengthened this holding.
Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex14 held that circumstances might
exist in which, without some form ofjurisdiction to attach property, courts
would be powerless to protect a litigant from the concealment or evac-
uation of his opponent's assets. The application of the International Shoe
notions of "fair play and substantial justice" would include consideration
of both the jeopardy to plaintiff's ultimate recovery and the limited nature
of the jurisdiction sought, jurisdiction merely to order the attachment and
not to adjudicate the underlying merits of the controversy. Where the
facts show that the presence of defendant's property within the state is
not merely fortuitous and that the attaching jurisdiction is not an incon-
venient arena for defendant to litigate the limited issues arising from the
attachment, assumption of limited jurisdiction to issue the attachment
pending litigation in another forum would be constitutionally permissible. 15
In Intermeat Inc. v. American Poultry, Inc. 16 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit further pointed out that the doctrine of "minimum
contacts" established in International Shoe requires the presence of
property of a defendant within New York to be viewed as only one contact
of the defendant with the state. It should be considered along with other
contacts in deciding whether the assertion of jurisdiction is consistent
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Hence, some
attachments valid under New York law, and constituting valid bases under
New York law for quasi rem jurisdiction, will no longer satisfy the due
process requirement where the defendant has less than minimum contacts
13. Id. at 211.
14. 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
15. Id. at 1048.
16. 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978).
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with New York. When jurisdiction is based upon an attachment the test
is whether sufficient minimum contacts exist to make it fair and just that
the foreign debtor be required to come to New York to defend the action
begun by attachment. Thus the court decides in each case whether the
relationship among the plaintiff, the defendant, and the forum state would
make it fair and reasonable to compel the defendant to try the action in
the forum state.1 7
Whether the exercise of in rem jurisdiction would, however, be justified
for the benefit of only lenders domiciled in New York remains at issue.
Equally doubtful is whether the issuance of a prejudgment attachment
would meet the constitutional standards if it were sought by a foreign
lender who, in the absence of other contacts with New York, agreed with
his foreign borrower in a forum selection clause that the New York court
in question should be empowered to exercise jurisdiction. A strong pre-
sumption seems to exist, however, in favor of the constitutionality of such
agreed-upon in rem jurisdiction.
Returning, then, to paragraph (1) of section 6201 of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules, note that, contrary to the decree in that para-
graph, prejudgment attachment against the assets of a foreign borrower
cannot be based alone upon the presence of tangible or intangible assets
of the borrower within a county or the city of New York. Further ties
with New York are necessary to satisfy the minimum contacts test. The
danger of the borrower's removing his property outside New York might
constitute such a tie justifying the exercise of jurisdiction, at least if the
lender were a domiciliary of New York. Similarly, a forum selection clause
stipulating that the lender may file for prejudgment attachments in all
jurisdictions where assets of the borrower are found might constitute such
a tie.
c. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter of the Action
United States federal courts have recognized that provisional jurisdic-
tion to order a prejudgment attachment is not tantamount to final juris-
diction to adjudicate the underlying merits of the controversy, that is,
jurisdiction over the subject matter. These two different categories of
jurisdiction must therefore be carefully distinguished. 18
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is of importance also when a pre-
judgment attachment is sought in New York. As previously discussed, by
virtue of section 6213 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules an
17. Id. at 1022-23; see also Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. d'Angelo, 453 F. Supp.
1294, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dictum); Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Co., 98 Misc.
2d 808, 409 N.Y.S. 2d 581, 583 (1978) (dictum).
18. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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order of attachment granted before an action is commenced is valid only
if, within sixty days after the order has been issued, a summons is served
upon the defendant or first publication of the summons against the de-
fendant is made pursuant to an order, and publication is subsequently
completed.
The question arises, however, whether section 6213 requires the action
supporting the attachment to be brought before a New York court, or
whether the lender may introduce such action before any court of com-
petent jurisdiction, domestic or foreign. The language in Shaffer v. Heitner'9
indicates that in order to avoid the vacation of a prejudgment attachment
in New York the subject matter does not necessarily have to be adjudicated
in a New York court. It appears sufficient for the merits of the underlying
controversy to be decided by a court sitting in New Jersey, England,
France, Germany, or elsewhere provided that such court would have
jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of minimum contacts satisfying
International Shoe standards. 20
d. Summary
In conclusion, it appears that domestic (and probably also foreign)
lenders may file for the prejudgment attachment of the assets of a New
York or foreign borrower before a New York court provided that, in the
absence of in personam jurisdiction over the borrower, the lender can
show sufficient minimum contacts tying the underlying controversy over
the loan to such an extent to New York that it appears fair and reasonable
to compel the borrower to defend in New York. If the borrower is a New
York domiciliary, a prejudgment attachment order would only be per-
missible if drastic action were required to safeguard the lender's interests.
If the borrower is a foreign state or a foreign corporation not qualified to
do business in New York, a lender may also assert that without prejudg-
ment attachment the lender risks loss of the sums due to him because of
the borrower's removal of his assets and their transfer into another state
or country. The validity of such prejudgment attachment would not be
impaired, however, by the fact that a New York court would lack juris-
diction to adjudicate the underlying merits of the controversy; the fact
19. 433 U.S. at 210: "At most, it suggests that a State in which property is located should
have jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of proper procedures, as security for a
judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with
International Shoe" (emphasis added).
20. The doctrinal references upon which the Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner relied,
also are apt to support the above-mentioned conclusion. See Beale, The Exercise of Juris-
diction in Rem to Compel Payment ofa Debt, 27 HARV. L. REV. 107, 123-24 (1913); Hazard,
A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 285; Von Mehren
& Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121,
1121-78 (1966).
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that the subject matter-the repayment of principal plus interest-would
have to be claimed before a court of a sister state or of a foreign country
is irrelevant.
2. "Prejudgment Attachments" in English Law
Though English courts have stressed that it is not "a form of pretrial
attachment," 2 1 the so-called Mareva injunction developed by the English
Court of Appeal in a famous decision of 1975,22 grants to certain plaintiffs
injunctive relief very similar to a prejudgment attachment. 23 In fact, when
analyzed in a functional approach, the Mareva injunction under English
law satisfies the same procedural needs as the prejudgment attachment
under the laws of New York and its sister states. 24
a. The Statutory Basis and the 1975 Mareva Case
The statutory basis upon which the Mareva injunction may be grounded
today is section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981,25 which reads:
The power of the High Court under subsection (I) 26 to grant an interlocutory
injunction restraining a party to any proceedings from removing from the ju-
risdiction of the High Court, or otherwise dealing with, assets located within
that jurisdiction shall be exercisable in cases where that party is, as well as in
cases where he is not, domiciled, resident or present within that jurisdiction.
21. See Iraqi Ministry of Defense v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A. (The Angel Bell), [1980]
I All E.R. 480, 486 (Q.B.); Cretanor Maritime Co. v. Irish Marine Management Ltd., [1978]
3 All E.R. 164, 170 (C.A.).
22. Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulk Carriers S.A., [19751 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 509 (C.A.). This decision was preceded by a similarjudgment in Nippon Yusen Kaishav
v. Karageorgis, [1975] 3 All E.R. 282 (C.A.) (Lord Denning).
23. The Mareva injunction seems to have become a widespread feature in English civil
litigation. See PCW (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd. v. Dixon, [19831 2 All E.R. 158, 160
(Q.B.):
[l]n 1979 applications were being made at the rate of 20 per month. Since 1979 that
number has doubled. In the Commercial Court alone applications for Mareva injunctions
are now running at the rate of 40 a month; in the Queen's Bench list the number of ex
parte applications has increased from 785 in 1979 to double that figure in 1983. No
doubt a large part of this increase is due to applications for Mareva relief.
24. As to English law before the Mareva decision, see notably Evans Marshall & Co. v.
Bertola S.A. [1973] I W.L.R. 349.
25. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 37(3). When the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision in Mareva this 1981 Act was not yet in effect. The Court of Appeals therefore
relied on Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Gen. 5, Ch. 49,
§ 45, which corresponded to § 37(3) of the 1981 Act. Section 45(1) of the 1925 Act read:
"The High Court may grant a mandamus or an injunction or appoint a receiver by an
interlocutory order in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient to
do so."
26. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 37(l) reads: "The High Court may by order
(whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which
it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so."
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In the 1975 Mareva case Lord Denning ruled that a court could, in a
proper case, grant an injunction to protect the right of a creditor to be
paid a debt owing to him even before he had established his right by
getting a judgment. If there were a danger that the debtor might dispose
of his assets so as to defeat the right of the creditor before judgment, the
court would have authority to grant an interlocutory judgment so as to
prevent the debtor from disposing of those assets. 27 In the Mareva case,
the court by injunction restrained the foreign defendant, who held no
assets in England except a bank account, from disposing of any of the
money in that account, or removing it from the jurisdiction. Lord Denning
held:
There is money in a bank in London which stands in the name of these [de-
fendants]. They [defendants] . . . have control of it. They may at any time
dispose of it or remove it out of this country. If they do so, the [plaintiffs] may
never get their ... [money, which was a charter hire for a ship the plaintiffs
had chartered to defendants]. The ship is now on the high seas. It has passed
Cape Town on its way to India. It will complete the voyage and the cargo will
be discharged. And the [plaintiffs] may not get their ... [money] at all. In face
of this danger, I think this court ought to grant an injunction to restrain the
defendants from disposing of these moneys now in the bank in London until
the trial or judgment in this action. 28
Since the Mareva injunction was first granted by the Court of Appeal
in that case, English courts have issued many other injunctions of the
same kind. To obtain such injunction, however, a creditor must clearly
demonstrate to the court the likelihood that he will be able to recover a
judgment against the defendant for a certain or approximate sum of
money.29
The policy of this injunction first had been defined as to prevent foreign
parties from removing assets from the jurisdiction to avoid the risk of
having to satisfy any judgment entered against them in proceedings in
England. 30 A foreign defendant should not have the chance to preclude
the plaintiff in advance from enjoying the fruits of ajudgment which would
27. Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulk Carriers S.A. [1975] 2 Lloyd's
Rep. 509, 510 (C.A.).
28. Mareva, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 511.
29. Z Ltd. v. A, [1982] I All E.R. 556, 572 (L.J. Kerr); see also Rasu Maritima S.A. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina) and Government of
Indonesia, [1977] 3 All E.R. 324, 334 (C.A.) (Lord Denning: "So I would hold that an order
restraining removal of assets can be made whenever the plaintiff can show that he has a
'good arguable case.' "); Establissement Esefka International Anstalt v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 445, 448 (Lord Denning); Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v.
Unimarine S.A., [1979] 2 All E.R. 972, 984.
30. Iraqi Ministry of Defense v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A. (The Angel Bell), [1980] 1
All E.R. 480, 485 (Q.B.)
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appear irresistible on the evidence before the court. 3 1 A foreign defendant
should be inhibited from largely ignoring a plaintiff's claim in the courts
of England and from snapping his fingers at any judgment that might be
given against him. 32 It was therefore held necessary, in issuing such in-
junction, to proceed by stealth to preempt any action by the defendant
to remove his assets from the jurisdiction. 33
b. Later Extensions of the Mareva Doctrine
Later decisions, notably the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Z Ltd.
v. A of December 1981,34 have considerably enlarged the field of appli-
cation of the new remedy and its underlying policy. It had already been
held in 1980 by the Court of Appeal that a Mareva injunction could not
only be granted against a foreigner, but also
Against a man even though he is based in this country if the circumstances are
such that there is a danger of his absconding, or a danger of the assets being
removed out of the jurisdiction or disposed of within the jurisdiction, or oth-
erwise dealt with so that there is a danger that the plaintiff, if he gets judgment,
will not be able to get it satisfied. 35
Along that doctrinal line section 37(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981
provides that an interlocutory injunction may be issued in cases where
the defendant is, as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled, resident,
or present within that jurisdiction. In the before-mentioned case of Z Ltd.
v. A the Court of Appeal very explicitly ruled that a Mareva injunction
could not only be granted to prevent a foreigner from removing assets
out of England, but also to inhibit an English domiciliary or a foreigner
from dissipating his assets within England itself and thereby jeopardizing
a future judgment against him. 36 In the words of L.R. Kerr:
31. See Establissment Esefka Int'l Anstalt v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1979] I Lloyd's
Rep. 445, 448, in which Lord Denning held that upon the particular circumstances of the
case there was no danger that defendant would take his money out of the country. Doubts
about the permissibility of a Mareva injunction were also mentioned in Third Chandris
Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 2 All E.R. 972, 985 (Lord Denning).
32. This was the language of J. Kerr, quoted with approval by Lord Denning, again, in
Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina)
and Government of Indonesia, [1977] 3 All E.R. 324, 334 (C.A.).
33. Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [19791 2 All E.R. 972, 978 and
Iraqi Ministry of Defense v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A. (The Angel Bell), [1980] I All E.R.
480, 485 (Q.B.).
34. Z Ltd. v. A, [1982] 1 All E.R. 556. See also the recent decision of the Queen's Bench
Division in Al Nahkale for Contracting and Trading Ltd. v. Lowe, [1986] 2 W.L.R. 317
(Q.B.), where a writ ne exeat regno was issued in conjunction with a Mareva injunction;
the issuance of such writ under similar circumstances had formerly been denied by the
Queen's Bench Division in Felton v. Callis, [1969] I Q.B. 200.
35. Prince Abdul Rahman Bin Turki Al Sudairi v. Abu-Taha, [1980] 3 All E.R. 409, 412
(C.A.).
36. Z Ltd. v. A. at 561 (Lord Denning). See also PWC (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd. v.
Dixon, 11983] 2 All E.R. 158, 162 (Q.B.).
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The danger of assets being removed from the jurisdiction is only one facet of
the 'ploy' of a defendant to make himself 'judgment-proof' by taking steps to
ensure that there are no available or traceable assets on the day of judgment;
not as the result of using his assets in the ordinary course of his business or
for living expenses, but to avoid execution by spiriting his assets away in the
interim . . . It is therefore logical to extend the scope of this jurisdiction when-
ever there is a risk of a judgment which a plaintiff seems likely to obtain being
defeated in this way.37
c. Limitations Inherent in Mareva Injunctions
The Court of Appeal, however, stressed in the Mareva decision three
limitations inherent either in the jurisdictions of the courts to order Mareva
injunctions or in the effects triggered by the injunctions. First, L.J. Kerr
pointed out 38 that a Mareva injunction would not be properly exercisable
against the majority of defendants who would be sued in English courts.
In noninternational cases, and also in many international cases, the de-
fendants would generally be persons or concerns established within the
jurisdiction in the sense of having assets in England. The defendants could
not, or would not wish to, dissipate such assets merely in order to avoid
some judgment likely to be given against them. The assets would either
be in the form of property in England, such as a house or a flat on which
their ordinary way of life would depend, or in the form of an established
business or other asset that they would be unlikely to liquidate simply in
order to avoid a judgment. The Mareva injunction thus should not be
debased by allowing it to become a mechanism invoked simply to obtain
security for ajudgment in advance, and still less as a means of pressuring
defendants into settlements.
The second limitation upon the Mareva injunction was emphasized by
L.J. Kerr when he ruled39 that it must never be abused by using it to
exert pressure on the defendant to settle the action when there is no real
danger of the defendant's dissipating assets to make himself judgment-
proof. Nor may it be used as a means of enabling a person to make a
payment under a contract or intended contract to someone when demand
for the payment appears unjustifiable or unlawful, and when obtaining a
Mareva injunction ex parte and immediately serving it in advance of the
payment would have the effect of freezing the sum paid over.
Third, Lord Denning has pointed out 40 that a Mareva injunction is a
method of attaching the asset itself. It operates in rem, just as the arrest
of a ship does, and it enables the seizure of assets so as to preserve them
for the benefit of the creditor, but not to give a charge in favor of any
37. Z Ltd. v. A, at 571 (L.J. Kerr).
38. Id. at 572.
39. Id. at 571, 572.
40. Id. at 562.
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particular creditor. The plaintiff could, therefore, never gain any priority
over the rights of other creditors of the defendant by obtaining a Mareva
injunction. 4 1
d. Another Limitation: The Ancillary
Nature of a Mareva Injunction
The House of Lords, in its Siskina decision of 1977,42 emphasized a
fourth prerequisite that must be met before a Mareva injunction can be
ordered, a prerequisite of utmost importance in the field of international
loans. In the Siskina decision Lord Diplock very clearly stated that a
Mareva injunction is ancillary only to a substantive pecuniary claim for
debt or damages. Hence, there should be a substantive claim to pecuniary
relief within the jurisdiction of the English courts upon which a Mareva
injunction could be based. In the absence of such jurisdiction of an English
court over a pecuniary cause of action, a Mareva injunction could not be
granted.
e. Summary
The law of prejudgment attachments in England may be stated as fol-
lows: A Mareva injunction may be issued in favor of an English or a
foreign lender against either an English or a foreign borrower. Several
prerequisites must be met before a Mareva injunction can be ordered.
First, it must appear likely that the plaintiff would recover judgment
against the defendant for a certain or approximate sum of money. Second,
there must be reasons to believe that the defendant has assets within
England to meet the judgment, in whole or in part, but that there is a
danger that the defendant may either remove them from, or dissipate them
within England so as to jeopardize an eventual future execution upon the
judgment. 43 Third, in all cases English courts must have jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the underlying controversy, that is upon the repayment
of principal or payment of interest. A Mareva injunction can never be
ordered simply to create for plaintiff in advance security for a judgment
in the absence of any danger that the assets of the defendant might be
removed from England or dissipated within its borders. A Mareva in-
junction must never be used to pressure a defendant into a settlement or
41. See PCW (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd. v. Dixon, [1983] 2 All E.R. 158, 162 (Q.B.);
Iraqi Ministry of Defense v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A. (The Angel Bell), [1980] 1 All E.R.
480, 486 (Q.B.); Cretanor Maritime Co. v. Irish Marine Management Ltd., [1978] 3 All E.R.
164, 170 (C.A.).
42. In re Siskina & Distos Compania Naviera S.A., [1977] 3 W.L.R. 818, 822-24 (Lord
Diplock).
43. As to the effects of a Mareva injunction where it affects money or other assets of the
defendant held by a bank or a third party, see Z Ltd. v. A, [1982] I All E.R. 556, 561-66
(Lord Denning).
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a payment when such payment appears unjustifiable and the injunction
would freeze his assets. Finally, a Mareva injunction only attaches, or
temporarily seizes, the defendant's assets without creating for the plaintiff
a priority over the rights of other creditors of the defendant.
Note within the present context that a Mareva injunction only lies
against the assets of a debtor when English courts are vested with the
jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying merits of the controversy. Insofar,
English law substantially differs from New York law. In New York a lender
might successfully file for a prejudgment attachment against the assets of
his borrower even though the courts having competent jurisdiction over
the subject matter would be foreign. English law, by contrast, requires
both that English courts be entrusted with jurisdiction to issue a Mareva
injunction and that they possess jurisdiction over the subject matter.
B. THE JURISDICTIONS OF THE EEC MEMBER STATES: THE IMPACT
OF ARTICLE 24 OF THE EEC CONVENTION OF 1968
The six original member states of the EEC on September 27, 1968,
entered into a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters44 which provides in article 24:
"Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such pro-
visional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of
that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts of another Contracting
State have jurisdiction to the substance of the matter." 45
44. The (amended, see infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text) English version of this
Convention can be found in the English Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, ch. 27.
This Convention has been extensively discussed in England and in the United States.
See, e.g., Collins, The Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention-Some Practical Aspects of
U.K. Accession, with Particular Reference to Jurisdiction, in HARMONIZATION OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EEC 91 (Lipstein ed. 1978); Hartley, Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters in the Eu-
ropean Communities, 2 EUR. L. REV. 143 (1977), 3 EUR. L. REV. 160 (1978), 4 EUR. L.
REV. 482 (1979); Herzog, The Common Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments: An Interim Update, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 417 (1977); Juenger, Judicial
Jurisdiction in the U.S. and in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1195 (1984); Kerr, The EEC Judgments Convention: Some Repercussions Beyond the
EEC, 15 EUROPARECHT 353 (1980); Kohler, Practical Experience of the Brussels Jurisdiction
and Judgments Convention in the Six Original Contracting States, 34 INTr'L & COMP. L.Q.
563 (1985); McClellan, Choice of Jurisdiction Clauses under the EEC Judgments Convention,
1984 J. Bus. L. 445; McClellan, The Convention of Brussels of September 27, 1968 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 228 (1978); Pocar, Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments under the EEC Convention of 1968, 42 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLAN-
DISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 405, 428 (1978); von Mehren. Recognition
and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current
Practice in the European Economic Community and the U.S., 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1044-
60(1981).
45. English Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, ch. 27.
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It follows from article 246 and article 4, paragraph 147 of the Convention
that article 24 applies only to defendants domiciled within one of the
contracting states. Thus defendants domiciled outside of the EEC do not
fall under the purview of that provision.
1. General Remarks
Whereas the convention has created 'uniform rules of jurisdiction over
all defendants domiciled within the EEC, its article 24 has carved out
from this unification all rules pertaining to prejudgment attachments by
referring insofar to the different national laws of its member states that
shall remain in effect. Thus for a lender who intends to file for a pre-
judgment attachment against the assets of his borrower that are located
within the EEC, the widely differing national rules of the six member
states are still in effect. One very important uniform rule has been set up
by the convention to facilitate the operation of provisional remedies.
Article 24 clearly states that it does not matter whether the courts of the
jurisdiction in which a prejudgment attachment has been filed for also
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. Consequently,
the courts of an EEC member state may issue a prejudgment attachment
even if, under the Convention, the courts of another EEC state have
jurisdiction as to the underlying pecuniary claim. 48
This rule of the EEC Convention is of great importance for international
lenders. To obtain an order for a prejudgment attachment in any one of
the original six member states lenders need not show that the courts in
which their motions for an attachment have been filed also have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of the loan and the interest to be paid thereon.
That the courts of any other member state of the EEC be entrusted, under
the Convention, with such jurisdiction suffices. It may even be asked
whether such subject matter jurisdiction has to be vested with any court
of a member state of the EEC or whether it suffices that a court sitting
outside of the EEC have such jurisdiction. The answer to that question
depends upon the national law of the member state where a creditor has
asked for a prejudgment attachment. If that law permits the creditor to
46. Id. art. 2 provides:
Subject to the provision of this Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State
shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State. Persons who are
not nationals of the State in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules
of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State.
47. Id. art. 4(1) provides: "If the defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, the
jurisdiction of the Courts of each Contracting State shall . . . be determined by the law of
that State."
48. See Collins, Provisional Measures, the Conflict of Laws and the Brussels Convention,
I Y.B. EuR. L. 249, 265 (1982).
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sue his borrower in a jurisdiction outside the EEC, a prejudgment at-
tachment could be issued even though it would not be the court of a
member state of the EEC which would be vested with that jurisdiction.
German law, for example, thus permits a prejudgment attachment to be
ordered against the German assets of a German or foreign borrower al-
though the creditor could sue the borrower to collect principal and interest
only before New York courts.
Article 24 of the Convention has immunized the different national laws
against the impact of that convention as far as "provisional measures"
are concerned. All problems of jurisdiction, therefore, have to be resolved
according to the national laws in effect in the various national member
states of the EEC. The only exception is the rule introduced by article
24 that the courts of one member state may order provisional measures
notwithstanding that the courts of another member state would be vested
with jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
2. The Convention on the Accession of
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom
On October 9, 1978, a Convention of Accession was signed between
the six original member states of the EEC and its three new member
states: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. 49 This Convention
left article 24 unchanged. 50 On November 1, 1986, this Convention of
Accession has entered into effect as between the six original member
states51 and Denmark, which ratified the convention in August 1986.52
Ratification has not yet been reported from the United Kingdom and
49. See supra note 44.
50. The previous discussion of the English law of prejudgment attachments, supra text
accompanying note 42, noted that according to a ruling of the House of Lords, a Mareva
injunction may only be issued by an English court if it has jurisdiction also over the substance
matter of the claim. In view of art. 24 of the EEC Convention, Lord Denning at a very
early stage (in May 1977) had decided that comity would require the United Kingdom to
follow suit to the six original members of the EEC even before the Convention of Accession
had entered into effect for it. The Court of Appeal, following Lord Denning, ruled that the
English High Court would be vested with jurisdiction to order the attachment of the assets
of a foreign defendant notwithstanding that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
merits of the claim. See Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A., [1977] 3 W.L.R. 532, 553
(C.A.). The House of Lords, however, reversed this decision in holding that it would be up
to the British legislature to perform such a step: "It is not for the Court of Appeal or for
your Lordships to exercise these legislative functions, however tempting this may be."
Siskina v. Distos S.A., [1977] 3 W.L.R. 818, 828 (H.L.).
5 I. Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Neth-
erlands have ratified the Convention.
52. The Convention on the Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, 21
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 304) art. 39, at 13 (1978).
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Ireland; 53 it is hoped that ratification by these two states will very soon
follow.
3. The Convention of Accession with Greece of 1982
On October 25, 1982, a Convention of Accession was signed between
the "old" nine member states of the EEC and its "new" member Greece.
Ratification of this convention is reported from only a few of its
signatories.5 4
4. Summary
International lenders may apply for prejudgment attachments against
the assets of their borrowers located in the six original member states of
the EEC according to the different national rules in effect in those states.
The 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters entered into between the six original mem-
ber states of the EEC has left the national rules pertaining to such at-
tachments unchanged. 55 Article 24 of the Convention provides, however,
that a creditor may file for a prejudgment attachment against the assets
of his borrower notwithstanding the fact that the court with which such
application is filed is not vested with the jurisdiction to adjudicate the
underlying subject matter, and that the court of another EEC state is
entrusted with that jurisdiction.
The Convention further permits a prejudgment attachment to be ordered
by a court of a member state of the EEC, even if a court sitting outside
of the EEC possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.
It is thus feasible to apply to a French or a German court, for instance,
for the order of a prejudgment attachment even though a court in New
York, for example, is entrusted, perhaps on the basis of a forum selection
clause, with the jurisdiction to rule upon the pecuniary claim at the pro-
tection of which the attachment aims. After the Conventions of Accession
53. The United Kingdom has prepared its Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982.
See The Public General Acts, 1982 ch. 27; see also COLLINS, THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS ACT 1982 (1983); HARTLEY, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS (1984).
54. Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands report ratifi-
cation. The Federal Republic of Germany is about to ratify. As of November 15, 1986,
ratification had not been reported from Great Britain, Ireland, and Greece.
As to the new EEC members, Spain and Portugal, no steps have been taken yet to enable
their accession to the Convention.
55. In its judgment of May 21, 1980, In re Bernhard Denilauber v. Coachet Freres, the
European Court has ruled that an order of attachment issued by a court of one member
state against the assets of a debtor situated in another member state, is susceptible of being
recognized and enforced, on the basis of the Convention, in that other member state only
if such order had been rendered after a fair hearing of the debtor. See matter of law no.
125/1979, reported in 1980 REPORTS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 1553.
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with Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, and with Greece will
have been ratified by all of these states, the same rules will prevail with
respect to prejudgment attachments applied for with the courts of these
new EEC member states.
C. Two CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
Article 24 of the EEC Convention of 1968 has thus clarified one of the
crucial problems arising when an international lender seeks a prejudgment
attachment against his borrower by providing that a concurrent jurisdic-
tion over the underlying claim is not necessary. Therefore, the jurisdic-
tional issues will only in a few respects have to be debated. The following
materials give a few elementary indications about how an international
lender can apply for prejudgment attachments in some European civil law
jurisdictions.
1. France56
Article 48(1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure provide:
In case of emergency and when the collection of a debt seems in danger, the
president of the district court ("cour de grande instance") or the local judge
sitting either at the domicile of the debtor or in the territory in which the
assets to be attached are situated, may authorize any creditor showing a
cause of action which appears to be justified, to provisionally attach the
movables, tangibles or intangibles, of his debtor.
The order is issued upon motion and has to mention the sum for which the
attachment has been authorized. It will fix, for the creditor, a time limit within
which he will have to introduce, before the court of competent jurisdiction,
either an action for validation of the provisional attachment or for specific
performance of the underlying claim, while a failure to meet this time-limit
will void the attachment. 5 7
This prejudgment attachment is called, in France, "saisie conserva-
toire;" if it is aimed at the garnishment of a claim of the debtor against
a third party, "saisie arret." A court may issue an order of attachment
without a previous notification or hearing of the defendant. The action
introduced by the creditor against the debtor for the validation of the
attachment or for the specific performance of the claim must contain a
56. See P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 235-37 (1967); G. DELAUME, SECTION
III: PROVISIONAL MEASURES: QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION AND ATTACHMENT 54, 55, in
TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, LAW & PRACTICE, BOOKLET I1, RELEASE 83-2 (July 1983);
Tait & Rossell, How to Gain Prejudgment Attachment, France, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct.
1983, at 29, 32-33.
57. Translation by the author of this article.
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copy of the attachment order.58 The debtor may apply for vacation of the
attachment showing "serious and legitimate grounds." '59
The court issuing the order of attachment may require the creditor to
show his solvency or to pay a security deposit into an escrow account
with the clerk of the court. 60 The debtor, on the other hand, may be
granted a vacation of the attachment upon his payment into the hands of
a sequester of sums sufficient to satisfy the claim of the creditor.61 Not
only movables and claims against third parties are subject to such an
attachment. The court may also authorize a creditor to attach the business
of a debtor by lodging a lien upon the commercial registry wherein such
business is entered. 62 A provisional mortgage may also be levied upon
an immovable of the debtor. 63
The previous section has stressed that French law does not require
French courts to have a concurrent jurisdiction also over the subject
matter underlying the attachment. This is not a new rule introduced into
French law by article 24 of the EEC Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1968. On
the contrary, this rule prevailed in French law about a century before the
convention entered into effect in 1973. The rule had first been clearly
enunciated by the French Cour de Cassation in 1868;64 it had then been
reaffirmed by the Cour de Cassation 65 and also by French Courts of
Appeal, 66 and for the last time by the Cour de Cassation in a famous
decision rendered in 1970.67 The judgment of the foreign court which is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter must, however, be sus-
ceptible of recognition and enforcement in France. Otherwise, the at-
tachment could not be validated. 68
58. See CODE DU PROCtDURE CIVILE art. 49.
59. See id. art. 50, para. (2). If the debtor is solvent or if there is no danger that he will
abscond or dissipate his assets, such serious and legitimate ground may be given.
60. See id. art. 48, para. (3).
61. See id. art. 50, pata. (1).
62. See id. art. 53.
63. See id. art. 54.
64. See Judgment of Mar. 23, 1868, Cass. req., 1868 Sirey Jurisprudence [S. Jur.] I 328.
65. See Judgment of Dec. 30, 1929, Cass. req., in 8 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL
[CLUNET] 94 (1931).
66. See the decisions cited by P. Francescakis, Saisie arret, in RIPERTO1RE Du DROIT
INTERNATIONAL (VOI. II, no. 60, Dalloz ed. 1969).
67. See Judgment of Jan. 14, 1970, Cass. req., 59 REVUE CRITIQUE DU DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PRIV6 [R.C.D.I.P.] 714 (1970) note P. Lagarde.
In Judgment of Nov. 6, 1979, Cass. Civ. Ire, 69 R.C.D.I.P. 588 (1980), the Cour de
Cassation even ruled that the in rem jurisdiction exercised with a prejudgment attachment
over an immovable necessarily creates also in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
68. See 59 R.C.D.I.P. 716, 717 (1970) note P Lagarde; and 69 R.C.D.I.P. 590, 596 (1980)
note G. Couchez.
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2. Federal Republic of Germany
The German law of prejudgment attachments is not very different from
its French counterpart.
a. General Rules
Section 916 paragraph (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that
a court may order a prejudgment attachment upon the movables, tangibles
or intangibles, and immovables of the debtor in order to secure a claim
for a liquidated sum of money or to secure a claim that is convertible into
a liquidated sum of money. According to section 917 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, an order for a prejudgment attachment may be issued only if
without such attachment the execution of the final judgment would be in
danger of being jeopardized or substantially impeded. The necessity to
enforce the judgment abroad has to be regarded as such jeopardy or
substantial impediment.
The creditor must furnish prima facie evidence not only as to the ex-
istence of his claim, but also as to the danger of jeopardy or substantial
impediment of its enforcement. 69 The court may require the creditor to
furnish security.70 The order of attachment may be issued without prior
notification or hearing of the debtor.71 Upon notification, the debtor may
file for the vacation of the attachment. 72 Each order of attachment has
to specify a security whose remittance entitles the debtor to its vacation. 73
The application for the prejudgment attachment may be filed either with
the court vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter or with the court
in the territory in which the assets to be attached are situated. 74 Under
normal circumstances, motions for a prejudgment attachment are brought
in the court of the situs of the assets, since the enforcement of an at-
tachment seems easier there than from the district of a remote court having
jurisdiction over the underlying claim.
Section 926 of the Code of Civil Procedure commands the court from
which the order of attachment emanates to direct the creditor to introduce,
within a specific time-limit fixed by the court, an action against the debtor
for specific performance of the underlying pecuniary claim. Failure to
comply with such direction obliges the court to vacate the attachment.
Such action for specific performance will sometimes be brought before
the court that issued the order of attachment. One characteristic of the
German law of jurisdiction is the recognition by section 23 of the Code
69. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] § 920(2).
70. See ZPO § 921 para. (2).
71. See ZPO § 921 para. (1).
72. See ZPO § 924.
73. See ZPO § 926.
74. See ZPO § 919.
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of Civil Procedure75 of exorbitant in personam jurisdiction over the de-
fendant by all courts in the territories of which a defendant holds his
assets. A creditor, therefore, is usually tempted to introduce his action
for specific performance of his underlying claim with the same court that
granted the attachment.
Such a concurrent forum for the action over the subject matter has
often been ruled out, however, in one of two ways. First, a forum selection
clause may point to a different forum. Second, article 2 of the before-
mentioned EEC Convention on the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1968 has, within the purview
to which it applies, suppressed the exorbitant jurisdiction of section 23
of the German Code of Civil Procedure. Then the court that ordered the
attachment will differ from the court vested with the power to decide the
underlying claim. The German law of civil procedure well establishes,
however, that a creditor who has been directed to introduce his pecuniary
claim underlying the attachment within a certain time-limit may raise that
action in a foreign court; provided that the judgment of such foreign court
would be entitled to recognition and enforcement in Germany. 76 Insofar,
German law resembles the laws of New York77 and of France. 78 For a
German court to exercise its jurisdiction to order a prejudgment attach-
ment, that court need not also be vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate
the subject matter for the protection of which the attachment had been
ordered.
b. A Specific Case
In this context, the Court of Appeal of Frankfurt several years ago
decided a rather complicated question. 79 An American corporation was
75. This section, translated into English, would read as follows:
(1) If the subject matter is not yet pending in court, the court having ordered the attachment
has, upon motion, to direct the creditor to introduce, within a time-limit to be fixed by the
Court, an action for the specific performance of the underlying claim. (2) If that direction
is not complied with, the attachment has, upon motion, to be vacated by a final judgment.
76. Hartmann, in A. BAUMBACH & W. LAUTERBACH, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 926 annot.
3 (44th ed. 1986); Vollkommer, in ZOELLER, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG annot. 10 (14th ed.
1984); Grunsky, in STEIN, JONAS & POHLE, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG §
926, annot. 111 (1975); Hausmann, ZurPruefung der Gerichtsbarkeit der New Yorker Gerichte
ueber ein iranisches Staatsunternehmen im inlaendischen Arrestverfahren, in 2 PRAXIS DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 51-56 (1982); Judgment of Oct. 21,
1980, Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt, in 26 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT
[R.I.W.] 874 (1980), and in 2 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENS-
RECHTS 71 (1982).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 7-20.
78. Id.
79. See Judgment of Oct. 21, 1980, in 26 R.I.W. 874-77 (1980), and in 2 PRAXIS DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 71-73 (1982); see also Hausmann,
supra note 76, at 51-56.
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the creditor of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). 80 This creditor
had introduced an action, against NIOC, for the payment of certain sums
of money in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. 81 In those proceedings NIOC claimed to be an Iranian state
enterprise and therefore immune from suit in a New York court.
While this action was pending, the United States assets of the NIOC
were frozen in November 1981, by order of President Carter following
the taking of the personnel of the United States embassy in Tehran as
hostages. 82 In view of this, the American creditor applied for and obtained
a prejudgment attachment with respect to certain assets of the NIOC
situated in the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e., in the district of the
Frankfurt District Court. After the Frankfurt District Court had ordered
the attachment, the NIOC filed a motion asking the court to direct the
American creditor to introduce an action for the subject-matter of the
claim. This motion was denied on account of the action pending in the
District Court of Southern New York.
The appeal of the NIOC against this denial was rejected by the Frankfurt
Court of Appeal. That court held that the court ordering the prejudgment
attachment could direct the creditor to introduce an action for the specific
performance of the claim underlying the attachment only if such action
was not yet pending in a court of competent jurisdiction. If the creditor
had instituted such proceedings against his debtor in a foreign rather than
a German court, those foreign proceedings could also induce litispendence
and would then render such direction of the attachment court inadmis-
sible. Litispendence and inadmissibility would ensue if the future judg-
ment of the foreign court would have to be recognized and enforced in
the Federal Republic of Germany. Such recognition and enforcement of
the eventual foreign judgment would, on its turn, depend upon whether
the respective foreign court would, by virtue of a mirror image application
of the domestic German rules ofjurisdiction, be vested with jurisdiction. 83
80. The amount of the claim underlying the attachment was about. six million United
States dollars.
81. The American creditor had already obtained, in New York, prejudgment attachments
amounting to about twelve million United States dollars.
82. In the wake of that freeze American courts also granted prejudgment attachments
upon the motions of other creditors, causing NIOC assets to the amount of $596 million to
be attached in the United States.
83. Section 328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure lists the prerequisites which a
foreign judgment must meet for its recognition and enforcement in the Federal Republic of
Germany. Section 328, para I, no. I requires the foreign judgment court to have had juris-
diction by virtue of a mirror image application of the German rules of jurisdiction. Pursuant
to § 328, para. I, no. 5, reciprocity in the recognition and enforcement of German judgments
by the respective foreign state must also be guaranteed. These two requirements, the most
important ones for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the Federal
Republic of Germany, were met in the NIOC case.
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The question whether the defendant was immune from jurisdiction in the
foreign court also had to be answered by German law.
The Frankfurt Court of Appeal ruled that according to domestic German
law the NIOC was immune from jurisdiction neither in German nor in
American courts. By virtue of a mirror image application of the domestic
German rules on jurisdiction, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York was vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject matter
of the underlying litigation. The eventual judgment of the New York Court
therefore would have to be recognized and enforced in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. With respect to the subject matter of the litigation,
litispendence would therefrom ensue for the Frankfurt District Court and
the Frankfurt Court of Appeal. Hence, the Frankfurt District Court which
had ordered the attachment was precluded from directing the American
creditor to introduce into any court an action for specific performance of
the pecuniary claim underlying the attachment. As a result the prejudg-
ment attachment of the German assets of the NIOC was maintained by
the Frankfurt courts while the proceedings on the subject matter of the
claim were pending before the District Court for the Southern District of
New York. 84
c. Summary
The Frankfurt case permits some general conclusions to be drawn from
the German law of prejudgment attachments. International lenders may
very well attach property of their German or foreign borrowers situated
in the Federal Republic of Germany in advance of a judgment. It does
not matter whether the creditors introduce their actions for the specific
performance of their claims underlying their attachments before a German
or a foreign court. But if international lenders institute proceedings on
the subject matter in a foreign, non-German court, they should ensure
that such court, by virtue either of the EEC Convention of 1968 or of a
mirror image application of the domestic German rules of jurisdiction, is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of their loan. Lenders
thereby assure the recognition and enforcement of their eventual judg-
ments in the Federal Republic of Germany. Actions introduced in courts
which are not vested with such jurisdiction will expose the lenders to the
risk of the vacation of the attachments they obtain.
84. On January 19, 1981, an agreement was reached between the United States and the
Islamic Republic of Iran. That agreement was embodied into a Declaration of the Govern-
ment of Algeria of January 20, 1981 concerning the settlement of claims by the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). Pursuant to that agreement, the proceedings
on the subject matter pending before the District Court for the Southern District of New
York were removed to the United States-Iranian Claims Settlement Tribunal in the Hague.
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3. Other Civil Law Jurisdictions
The provisional remedy of the prejudgment attachment is known to
many, if not all civil law jurisdictions. 85 Whether a prejudgment attach-
ment can only be ordered when and insofar as jurisdiction over the subject
matter underlying the attachment also is vested with the courts of that
country varies with the law of each country.
D. Results
Our comparative survey has led to the conclusions that follow. First,
in the absence of any contractual stipulation with respect to prejudgment
attachments, international lenders will be successful in filing for such an
attachment with the courts of the following countries irrespective of
whether those courts are vested with jurisdiction over the underlying
pecuniary claim: New York, by virtue of sections 6201, 6211, and 6213
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules; 86 France, by virtue of
article 48 of the French Code of Civil Procedure; 87 the Federal Republic
of Germany, by virtue of sections 916 through 926 of the German Code
of Civil Procedure; 88 and a number of other common law states or civil
law countries. 89 Thus, forum selection clauses dealing solely with juris-
diction over the underlying claim would be of no importance whatsoever
for the obtaining of prejudgment attachments in those countries. The
courts of those countries would have to order attachments though they
would not be vested with jurisdiction over the underlying claims.
Second, in the absence of any contractual stipulation with respect to
prejudgment attachments and in addition to the conclusions expressed in
the preceding paragraph, the courts of the six original member states of
the EEC and of Denmark will order, by virtue of article 24 of the EEC
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters of 1968, prejudgment attachments insofar as
their national laws provide. Such orders are granted, however, only on
the condition that the courts of any other of the six original EEC member
states or of Denmark have jurisdiction over the substance matter of the
claim. 90
Third, after Great Britain, Ireland, and Greece have effectively acceded
to the before-mentioned EEC Convention, the same rule enunciated in
85. Tait & Rossel, How to Gain Prejudgment Attachment, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Oct. 1983,
at 29, discussing the attachment procedures in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 7-20.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 56-68.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 69-84.
89. See supra text accompanying note 85.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
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the preceding paragraph will also prevail in those countries. 9 1 Until the
accession of Great Britain to the EEC Convention becomes effective,
British courts will not order a Mareva injunction that is more or less
tantamount in effect to a prejudgment attachment unless British courts
also have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying claim. 92
Finally, the parties to the loan agreement may have stipulated that a
prejudgment attachment must not be brought in any one of the jurisdic-
tions mentioned in the preceding three paragraphs. Such stipulation will
prevail over the before-mentioned statutory regulations. The courts pre-
cluded by that stipulation will not be vested with jurisdiction to order an
attachment.
III. The Drafting of Forum Selection Clauses
A. Two CATEGORIES OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES 9 3
Under the angle of their purview, two categories of forum selection
clauses may be distinguished: (i) forum selection clauses which provide
for both jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying claim and
for jurisdiction to order a prejudgment attachment (double-functional forum
selection clauses); and (ii) forum selection clauses which refer only to the
jurisdiction over the subject matter and omit any provision as to the
jurisdiction over attachment proceedings (simple forum selection clauses).
Both categories may again be subdivided into exclusive and nonexclu-
sive forum selection clauses. 94 Exclusive forum selection clauses simul-
taneously are of prorogative and of derogative nature. They are of pro-
rogative nature insofar as they assert a jurisdiction which under common
law or statutory law might already exist, and also insofar as they create
a new jurisdiction. They are of derogative nature insofar as they preclude
the party from filing an action or a petition for an attachment in courts
which otherwise, by common law or by statutory law, would be vested
with such jurisdiction. Nonexclusive forum selection clauses are of pro-
rogative nature only. Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
these categories and subcategories of forum selection clauses in view of
the needs of international lenders and borrowers who consider the ne-
cessity or possibility of eventual prejudgment attachments follows.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 21-43.
93. As to other categorizations of forum selection clauses, see Gruson, Controlling Site
of Litigation, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 29-50 (M. Gruson & R.
Reisner, ed. 1984); Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Com-
mercial Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133.
94. See Gruson, supra note 93, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133.
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B. DOUBLE-FUNCTIONAL FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
Double-functional forum selection clauses provide for both jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the underlying claim and for jurisdiction to
order a prejudgment attachment. They may be of prorogative or of de-
rogative nature or simultaneously of both natures. Insofar as they are of
prorogative kind and assert or confer jurisdiction to order prejudgment
attachments, they assist the international lender by entitling him to file
for prejudgment attachments in all jurisdictions covered by the clause.
By contrast, they disadvantage the borrower, whose assets are subject to
an eventual attachment in all jurisdictions included in the clause. Insofar
as double-functional forum selection clauses are of derogative nature in
precluding the lender from bringing an action or filing for a prejudgment
attachment, they aid the borrower, whose assets would otherwise be
subject to eventual attachments. Vice versa, they are of disadvantage to
the lender for the same reason.
It is important, therefore, to classify a forum selection clause as double-
functional or simple; and if it is double-functional, as prorogative or de-
rogative in nature. The distinction between double-functional and simple
forum selection clauses is easy when these clauses expressly dispose of
prejudgment attachments. This distinction becomes more difficult, how-
ever, when their nature as double-functional or simple has to be surmised
from a tacit or presumed intention of the parties to the loan agreement.
Legions of different forum selection clauses are used in international
loan agreements. This article, therefore, cannot review all of the clauses.
The author has at his disposal only a limited number of samples. 95 Review
of these samples nevertheless shows that many of them give rise to serious
problems of construction better avoided.
1. Express Double-Functional Forum Selection Clauses
Although these clauses are very rare, Delaume has proposed the use
of one clause of this kind. His clause will greatly enhance the position of
the lender and weaken that of the borrower by entitling the lender to file
for prejudgment attachments in any jurisdiction where assets of the bor-
rower are situated. His clause reads:
The parties hereby submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of (e.g., the High Court
of Justice in England) as regards all matters arising out of, or in connection
with, this contract; provided, however, that such submission shall not preclude
any party to this contract from taking any provisional measure or pursuing any
provisional remedies, such as attachment or similar proceedings, which may
95. Because many of these samples have only confidentially been given to him by private
banks the author is not entitled to publish them.
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be available to such party under the laws of any jurisdiction (including without
limitation the courts of and any courts of the United States or the State of (e.g.,
New York) against the assets of the other party.96
This clause is advantageously clear, unambiguous, and leaves no room
for any construction whatsoever.
2. Tacit or Implied-in-Fact
Double-Functional
Forum Selection Clauses
Some forum selection clauses in international loan agreements do not
expressly mention prejudgment attachments. Nevertheless, the wording
of such clauses leaves no doubt that they are meant to confer jurisdiction
not only over the subject matter of the underlying loan, but also over
eventual prejudgment proceedings. The following forum selection clause
exemplifies this subcategory in which the tacit intention of the parties can
with certainty be inferred that their clause should embrace both jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter and jurisdiction over eventual prejudgment
attachments:
The borrower hereby consents generally in respect of any legal action or pro-
ceedings arising out of or in connection with this Agreement to the giving of
any relief or the issue of any process in connection with such action or pro-
ceedings including, without limitation, the making, enforcement or execution
against any property whatsoever . . . of any order or judgment. 97 (Emphasis
added.)
3. Presumed or Implied-in-Law
Double-Functional
Forum Selection Clauses
Many forum selection clauses are not as unambiguous, unequivocal,
and clear as the clauses quoted in the preceding two paragraphs. On the
contrary, some clauses leave doubts as to whether they are of a double-
functional nature in that they also confer jurisdiction over prejudgment
attachments. It is impossible, therefore, to derive from them with any
degree of certainty a tacit understanding of the parties that their forum
selection clause was intended to embrace prejudgment attachments.
Ambiguous forum selection clauses need to be carefully construed.
Before tackling such construction, one must determine which national
rules of construction apply to the clause. A forum selection clause is an
integral part of the loan agreement, and is governed, therefore, by the
96. See Delaume, supra note 56, at 58.
97. Samples of this clause have been confidentially given to the author by two German
banks.
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proper law to which the entire loan agreement is subject. 98 The proper
law of a loan agreement may be New York law, English law, French law,
German law, the law of another state of the United States, or the national
law of any other country. Differences may exist between these federal or
national laws as to their rules of construction. All these laws concur,
however, in providing that in the absence of an express or tacit intention
of the parties their agreement must be construed according to their pre-
sumed intention. That intention is tantamount to an implication, by law,
of the respective forum selection clause.
99
Wherever it is impossible, therefore, to derive from the wording of a
forum selection clause a tacit understanding of the parties as to the pur-
view of their forum selection clause, the clause must be construed ac-
cording to their presumed intention. The construction is uncertain, un-
predictable, and gives rise to many doubts. The use of such ambiguous
selection clauses should be avoided. Nevertheless, as mentioned above,
many forum selection clauses need such construction because it is unclear
whether or not they embrace prejudgment attachments.
A few samples follow:
The Borrower agrees that any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in
connection with this agreement may be brought in the Courts of ... or ....
(Emphasis added.)1°°
The submission to the said jurisdictions shall not (and shall not be construed
so as to) limit the right of the Agent, the Managers and the Bank or any of
98. As to the proper law of the loan agreement, see P. WooD, supra note 1, at 1-19;
Gruson, Controlling Choice of Law, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 51--
67 (M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds. 1984).
99. As to English law, see Aspdin v. Austin, 114 Eng. Rep. 1402, 1407 (Q.B. 1844):
[I]t is one thing for the court to effectuate the intention of the parties to the extent to
which they may have, even imperfectly, expressed themselves, and another to add to
the instrument all such covenants as upon a full consideration the Court may deem
fitting for completing the intentions of the parties, but which they, either purposely or
unintentionally, have omitted. The former is but the application of a rule of construction
to that which is written; the latter adds to the obligations by which the parties have
bound themselves, and is of course quite unauthorized .... (Emphasis added.)
A few years later, with the decision in The Moorcock, 14 P.D. 64, (1889), the so-called
Moorcock doctrine came into existence when L.J. Bowen held:
Now, an implied warranty, or, as it is called, a covenant in law, as distinguished from
an express contract or express warranty, really is in all cases founded on the presumed
intention of the parties, and upon reason .... [Aind I believe if one were to take all
the cases, and they are many, of implied warranties or covenants in law, it will be found
that in all of them the law is raising an implication from the presumed intention of the
parties with the object of giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must
have intended that at all events it should have.
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
Since then, this doctrine has been well established in English law. See 37 HALSBURY'S LAWS
OF ENGLAND § 362 (4th ed. 1982).
100. German banks have confidentially given samples of this clause to the author of this
article.
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them to take proceedings against the Borrower in whatsoever jurisdiction shall
to it or to them seem fit nor shall the taking of proceedings in any one or more
jurisdictions preclude the taking of proceedings in any otherjurisdiction whether
concurrently or not. (Emphasis added.)
The Borrower hereby irrevocably accepts, for itself and in respect of its assets,
generally and unconditionally the (nonexclusive) jurisdiction of the aforesaid
Courts. (Emphasis added.)
The Borrower hereby irrevocably:
(a) submits to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and
the State courts of and the Federal Courts in the State of New York in
respect of any legal proceedings in connection with this Agreement. (Em-
phasis added.) 10 1
The Borrower agrees that any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement against the Borrower or its assets may be
brought in the English courts, in the State courts or the Federal courts in the
State of ... or elsewhere as any Bank or the Agent may elect. . . . (Emphasis
added.) 102
The Borrower agrees that any legal action or proceedings arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement against the Borrower or its assets may be
brought in the . . . English courts or the courts of (country of Borrower)....
(Emphasis added.) 10 3
The Borrower hereby irrevocably submits to the nonexclusive jurisdiction of
the High Court of Justice in .. . . the Courts of the State of. . . and the Courts
of the . .. in relation to any claim, dispute or difference which may arise
hereunder or any document entered into pursuant hereto or in connection here-
with but without prejudice to the rights of the Agent or the Banks to commence
any legal action or proceeding in the courts of any other competent jurisdiction.
... (Emphasis added.) 10 4
The clauses give rise to doubt as to whether they contemplate juris-
diction over prejudgment attachments. Such clauses may cause other
doubts. Some of the clauses cited are ambiguous within themselves: they
do not indicate with reasonable certainty whether they are meant to be
of exclusive or of nonexclusive nature. Such ambiguity then confuses the
jurisdiction over attachment proceedings: it remains equally doubtful
whether such eventual jurisdiction over prejudgment attachments will be
of exclusive or of nonexclusive nature.
The abovementioned 10 5 attachments by some American, Canadian, and
Swiss banks of shares that the Government of Iran held in some important
German corporations serve as an example. The forum selection clause
101. This example is taken from P. WooD, supra note 1, at 87.
102. This example is taken from Chronnell & Watson, Selected Specimen Clauses for
Syndicated Loans, in SOVEREIGN BORROWERS 243 (L. Kalderdn & Q. Siddiqi eds. 1984).
103. Id. at 244.
104. This example is taken from Cates and Isern-Feliu, Governing Law and Jurisdiction
Clauses in Euroloan Agreements, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1983, at 31.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
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which was embodied in the respective loan agreement 10 6 did not clearly
indicate whether it was meant to cover prejudgment attachments. In ad-
dition, that clause did not mention anything as to whether it was exclusive
or nonexclusive in nature. The consequence was an intense battle before
the German attachment court as to the legality of the order of the pre-
judgment attachments. The Iranian respondent alleged that the forum
selection clause was double-functional in nature, that it did embrace ju-
risdiction over the subject matter as well as jurisdiction over prejudgment
attachments; but that such jurisdiction was meant to be exclusive. Re-
spondent asserted that jurisdiction vested only with the non-German courts
expressly mentioned in the clause and that the forum selection clause did
not provide for any jurisdiction of German courts. For that reason re-
spondent argued that the orders of attachment should be vacated by the
German attachment court.
C. SIMPLE FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
Simple forum selection clauses refer only to the jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the loan and omit any provision as to the jurisdiction
over attachment proceedings. Such clauses have several effects. The in-
ternational lender can avail himself of any attachment jurisdiction estab-
lished either by common law or by statutory law of any country where
assets of his borrower are situated. The comparative survey demonstrated
that international lenders may file for prejudgment attachments in many
countries even though the courts of these countries would not be vested
with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the loan. This situation there-
fore benefits the lender and places the borrower at a disadvantage.
Simple forum selection clauses do not give rise to any problems of
construction. Although they leave open the issue of prejudgment attach-
ments, they will not create problems all by themselves. Their use therefore
does not raise serious objections.
D. CONCLUSION
Double-functional forum selection clauses provide for both jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the underlying claim and jurisdiction to order
106. This clause was worded as follows:
Any legal action or proceedings with respect to this Agreement by the Borrower may
be brought at the option of the Borrower in any court of competent jurisdiction in Iran
or elsewhere and against the Borrower may be brought at the option of any Bank or
the Agent in the courts of England or Iran or in courts of competent jurisdiction located
in the state of New York, and, by execution and delivery of this Agreement, the
Borrower hereby accepts, for itself and in respect of its assets, generally and uncon-
ditionally the jurisdiction of the aforesaid courts .... (Emphasis added.)
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prejudgment attachments. Their use can be recommended if they un-
equivocally extend to prejudgment attachments and when their exclusive
or nonexclusive nature is unambiguous. Simple forum selection clauses
refer only to the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the loan and omit
any provision as to jurisdiction over attachment proceedings. Their use
does not raise serious objections.
IV. Prejudgment Attachments against Foreign Sovereigns
Many borrowers of international loans are foreign sovereigns. When
their assets are seized by way of a prejudgment attachment they may
claim the privilege of sovereign immunity. It is important, therefore, to
know how far this privilege extends and how a waiver must be worded
by which the operation of such defense can successfully be avoided.
A. THE ASSETS OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
AND THE DEFENSE OF IMMUNITY
This discussion will be governed by three basic tenets. First, we need
not inquire into the rules of immunity from suit, but into the rules of
immunity from attachment; the latter differ from the former. Second, with
respect to immunity from attachment, only a very few concise, common
rules in the law of nations exist providing, for example, that the premises
of a foreign embassy or consulate must not be seized by a court of the
lex fori. Apart from these few explicit rules the law of nations has not
yet been able to further develop detailed rules on immunity from attach-
ment, which would give clear guidance as to which assets of a foreign
sovereign would be subject to attachment and which would be immune
therefrom. For this reason, third, this discussion cannot report on uniform
rules of immunity but must give a short comparative survey on the dif-
ferent rules of immunity prevalent in some of the commercially and fi-
nancially important countries.
1. United States10 7
Section 1610(d) of the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of
October 21, 1976108 provides:
(d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603 (a) of this chapter,
used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from
attachment prior to the entry of judgment in any action brought in a court of
107. See Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399, 413-17 (1977), for an overview of the American
practice with waivers of sovereign immunity.
108. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(d) (1977 & Supp. 1986).
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the United States or of a State, or prior to the elapse of the period of time
provided in subsection (c) 10 9 of this section, if
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior
to judgment, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state
may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that
has been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, and not to
obtain jurisdiction.
Whereas section 16 10(d) FSIA thus allows the assets of a foreign sovereign
to be attached under certain conditions, section 1611 removes certain
types of property from any attachment ordered by the courts of the lex
fori. 110
The very clear wording of section 1610(d) indicates that the assets of
a foreign state can, by way of exception, only be attached if "the foreign
state has explicitly waived its immunity from attachment prior to judg-
ment."III It is crucial, therefore, for any lender who files for the pre-
judgment attachment of the assets of his foreign sovereign borrower to
be able to present to the court an "explicit" waiver of "immunity from
attachment prior to judgment." 112
109. Subsection (c) reads:
No attachment or execution referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall
be permitted until the court has ordered such attachment and execution after having
determined that a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry ofjudgment
and the giving of any notice required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1982).
110. Section 1611 reads:
Certain types of property immune from execution.
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter, the property of
those organizations designated by the President as being entitled to enjoy the privileges,
exemptions, and immunities provided by the International Organizations Immunities
Act shall not be subject to attachment or any other judicial process impeding the
disbursement of funds to, or on the order of, a foreign state as the result of an action
brought in the courts of the United States or of the States.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter, the property of a
foreign state shall be immune from attachment and from execution, if-
(I) the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its
own account, unless such bank or authority, or its parent foreign government, has
explicitly waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution,
notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the bank, authority or govern-
ment may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, or
(2) the property is, or is intended to be, used in connection with a military activity
and
(A) is of a military character, or
(B) is under the control of a military authority or defense agency.
Id. § 1611.
Ill. Id. § 1610(d)(l).
112. See also Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. 383, 393
(D.N.J. 1979) where it was held that "Congress did not intend to allow implied waivers of
immunity from attachment prior to judgment" under the FSIA. See also E-Systems, Inc.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294, 1301-02 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
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In this respect the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held in 1982
that to be effective under the Act a waiver need not recite the words
"prejudgment attachment" in haec verbae or otherwise contain an express
reference to this form of legal proceeding. 113 Section 1610(d)(l) would
not require recitation of the word "prejudgment attachment" as an op-
erative formula because the purpose of this provision would be to preclude
inadvertent, implied, or constructive waivers where the intent of the for-
eign state is equivocal or ambiguous. A clause providing that the debtor
"waives any right or immunity from legal proceedings including suit judg-
ment and execution on grounds of sovereignty which it or its property
may now or hereafter enjoy"l14 was therefore held to constitute a valid
waiver under section 1610(d)(1).
The same Court ruled a year later that a waiver clause contained in an
international trade agreement between the United States and Rumania
providing that nationals, firms, companies, and economic organizations
of either party "shall not ... enjoy immunities from suit or execution of
judgment or other liability in the territory of the other party"115 is not a
sufficient waiver under section 1610(d)(1), since waivers of immunity from
suit or from execution of judgment have no bearing upon the question of
immunity from prejudgment attachment. 116 The only clause that might be
construed as a waiver of immunity from prejudgment attachment, the
words reading "immunities from ... other liability in the territory of the
other party," did not explicitly include waivers of immunity from pre-
judgment attachments. This clause was therefore held not to meet the
requirement of explicitness established by section 1610(d)(1).
Finally, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ren-
dered an opinion in 1984 holding that a clause providing that debtors
would "hereby waive any right or immunity barring claims" and that
debtors "submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of any State or Federal
Court of New York, sitting in New York, relative to any action or pro-
ceeding deriving from this promissory note or related to same" also does
not constitute a sufficient waiver under section 1610(d)(1).11 7 This clause
would not evince a clear and unambiguous intent to waive immunity from
prejudgment attachments. The "relative to any action or proceeding"
language would appear to relate only to personal jurisdiction, as opposed
to the sovereign immunity waiver. Had the phrase "relative to any action
113. Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 676 F. 2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 48.
115. S & S Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F. 2d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 161 (1983).
116. Id. at 416-18.
117. Banque Compafina v. Banco de Guatemala, 583 F. Supp. 320, 323-25 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
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or proceeding" appeared in the immunity clause, the solution of this
problem might, however, have been different.118
2. Great Britain
Section 13 paragraphs (2) to (5) of the State Immunity Act of 1978
provide:
(2) Subject to subsection (3) and (4) below
(a) ...
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for the
enforcement of a judgment or arbitration award or, in an action in rem,
for its arrest, detention or sale.
(3) Subsection (2) above does not prevent the giving of any relief or the issue
of any process with the written consent of the State concerned; and any such
consent (which may be contained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so
as to apply to a limited extent or generally; but a provision merely submitting
to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be regarded as a consent for the
purposes of this subsection.
(4) Subsection (2) (b) above does not prevent the issue of any process in
respect of property which is for the time being in use or intended for use for
commercial purposes; but, in a case not falling within section 10 above'' 9
this subsection applies to property of a State party to the European Con-
vention on State Immunity only if
(a) the process is for enforcing ajudgment which is final within the meaning
of section 18(l)(b) below and the State has made a declaration under
Article 24 of the Convention; or
(b) the process is for enforcing an arbitration award.
(5) The head of a State's diplomatic mission in the United Kingdom, or the
person for the time being performing his functions, shall be deemed to have
authority to give on behalf of the State any such consent as is mentioned in
subsection (3) above and, for the purposes of subsection (4) above, his cer-
tificate to the effect that any property is not in use or intended for use by or
on behalf of the State for commercial purposes shall be accepted as sufficient
evidence of that fact unless the contrary is proved.
Mareva injunctions may thus be obtained, in Great Britain, with respect
to the assets of a foreign sovereign in two situations only: if such assets
are presently used or intended to be used for commercial purposes (sub-
118. It is disputed whether a foreign central bank or monetary authority holding funds
for its own account, may waive the defense of immunity pursuant to § 161 l(b)(1) or pursuant
to § 1610(b)(l) since the former provision does not mention prejudgment attachments and
since it is doubtful whether waivers declared under the latter provision may be sufficient
waivers also under the former. See Banque Compafina v. Banco de Guatemala, 583 F. Supp.
320, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 209 (1979); Nichols, The Impact of the
Foreign Sovereign Inmunities Act on the Enforcement of Lenders Remedies, 1982 U. ILL.
L. REV. 251, 260; Patrikis, Foreign Central Batik Property: Immunity from Attachment in
the United States, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 277-78.
119. Section 10, referred to in subsection (4) above, deals with admiralty matters.
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section (4)); or if "written consent" of the debtor state has been given
(subsection (3)). 120 The first-mentioned exception of the "use for com-
mercial purposes" is subject to many limitations and exceptions. 121 The
only reliable instrument, therefore, for ruling out a foreign sovereign's
defense of immunity, is his prior written consent. Hence, it is important
to know whether this consent must be express or whether it may be
implied in fact or in law. Though this question cannot be answered with
much certainty, an implication in fact or in law hardly seems permissible.
The Act embodies the principle of immunity from "arrest" as the common
rule. The "written consent" only derogates that rule by way of an ex-
ception, thereby entailing the application of the old rule of interpretation
that exceptions must be strictly construed.
Taking into consideration, on the other hand, the rules of in dubio pro
immunitate advocated in the law of nations, 122 it can hardly be assumed
that English courts would issue a Mareva injunction against the assets of
a foreign sovereign without its express written prior consent. Thus, if an
international lender intends to preserve his option to file, for the order of
a Mareva injunction against the assets of his sovereign borrower within
Great Britain, he should avail himself in the loan agreement of the express
written consent of his borrower with respect to such injunction. 123
120. See Mann, Sovereign Immunity under English Law, in Sovereign Lending: Managing
Legal Risk 103, 114-15 (M. Gruson & R. Reisner ed. 1984); Brandon, Immunity from
Attachment and Execution, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1982, at 32-34; White, The State
Immunity Act 1978, 1979 J. Bus. L. 105, 107.
121. As to the meaning of this exception, see Alcom Ltd. v. Columbia, 22 INT'L LEG.
MAT. 1307 (1984) (C. A. 1982).
122. It is true that English authors dealing with immunity in the law of nations have not
expressly endorsed this principle. It has, however, been widely recognized in treatises on
international law written in other nations, e.g. by German writers (see, e.g., F. BERBER,
LEHRBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 223 (2d ed. 1975). In substance, however, British courts
seem implicitly to follow the rationale embodied in this rule when dealing with problems of
immunity.
123. Canada's State Immunity Act of June 3, 1982, ch. 95, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 2949,
has adopted a somewhat more liberal attitude in this respect. Its § I1 provides:
(I) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), property of a foreign state that is located in
Canada is immune from attachment and execution and, in the case of an action in
rem, from arrest, detention, seizure and forfeiture except where
(a) the state has, either explicitly or by implication, waived its immunity from at-
tachment, execution, arrest, detention, seizure or forfeiture, unless the foreign
state has withdrawn the waiver of immunity in accordance with any term thereof
that permits such withdrawal;
(b) the property is used or is intended for a commercial activity; or
(c) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in property that has been
acquired by succession or gift or in immovable property located in Canada.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), property of an agency of a foreign state is not immune
from attachment and execution and, in the case of an action in rem, from arrest,
detention, seizure and forfeiture, for the purpose of satisfying a judgment of a court
in any proceedings in respect of which the agency is not immune from the jurisdiction
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3. France24
France does not have a statute that defines the boundaries of the im-
munities enjoyed by foreign sovereigns. In a famous landmark decision
rendered in March 1984,125 however, the French Supreme Court redefined
the position of French law vis-A-vis the immunities enjoyed by foreign
sovereigns with respect to their assets located in France by way of some
very fundamental principles. 126
The French Supreme Court enunciated three basic principles which will
henceforth control the operation of the defense of immunity in cases
involving prejudgment attachments in France of the assets of foreign
sovereigns. First, not the law of nations, but the domestic rules of French
conflict of laws define the limits of any immunity enjoyed by foreign
sovereigns with respect to their assets in France. 127 Second, a firmly
established general principle of French conflict of laws holds that the
assets of a foreign sovereign located in France are not subject to pre-
judgment attachments ordered by French courts. Third, this general prin-
ciple of immunity from attachment is derogated by a rule of exception
stating that such assets may be seized by way of a prejudgment attachment
provided they have been used for the same commercial activity from which
the underlying cause of action has arisen. 128
of the court by reason of any provision of this Act.
(3) Property of a foreign state
(a) that is used or is intended to be used in connection with a military activity, and
(b) that is military in nature or is under the control of a military authority or defense
agency is immune from attachment and execution and, in the case of an action
in rem, from arrest, detention, seizure and forfeiture.
(4) Subject to subsection (5), property of a foreign central bank or monetary authority
that is held for its own account and is not used or intended for a commercial activity
is immune from attachment and execution.
(5) The immunity conferred on property of a foreign central bank or monetary authority
by subsection (4) does not apply where the bank, authority or its parent foreign
government has explicitly waived the immunity, unless the bank, authority or gov-
ernment has withdrawn the waiver of immunity in accordance with any term thereof
that permits such withdrawal.
124. For a very recent and detailed report on the French law of immunity from execution
and attachment, see Synvet, Quelques reflexions sur I'immunit d'exdcution de I'tat etran-
ger, 112 J. DR. INT'L 865 (1985).
125. Judgment of Mar. 14, 1984, Cass. Civ. Ire, Fr., I II J. DR. INT'L 598 note B. Oppetit.
126. For some important judgments which have preceded the above-mentioned landmark
decision, see: Judgment of Feb. II, 1969, Cass. Civ. Ire, Fr., 96 J. DR. INT'L 923 note P.
Kahn; Judgment of Dec. 7, 1977, Cass. Civ. Ire, 67 R.C.D.I.P. 532 (1978) note P. Bourel;
Judgment of Sept. 12, 1978, Premier Vice president du Tribunal de grand instance, Paris,
106 J. DR. INT'L 857 note B. Oppetit; Judgment of Mar. 5, 1979, Tribunal de grand instance
de Paris (Trib. gr. inst.), 106 J. DR. INT'L 857, 859, note B. Oppetit.
127. Synvet, supra note 124, at 866-67.
128. The rule established by the French Supreme Court reads in its original French version:
"Attendu que l'immunit6 d'exdcution dont jouit I'Etat 6tranger est de principe; que, tou-
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The assets seized not only must be in commercial use or intended to
be used for commercial purposes; but also there must be a substantive
coherence or a material tie between those assets and the subject matter
of the claim for the protection of which the attachment is sought. Ob-
viously in practice it will be very difficult to carry out the distinctions
between commercial and noncommercial (sovereign) use, and between
material relationship linking the seized assets with the underlying claim
and nonmaterial or nonexisting relationship without sufficient links be-
tween the two. The way of the international lender to that exception will,
therefore, often be paved with insurmountable difficulties. 129
In view of the foregoing discussion, the question must again be asked
whether another exception is available to the international lender: the
prior consent of the sovereign borrower to an eventual prejudgment at-
tachment of his assets in France. True, the French Supreme Court has
not mentioned such waiver of immunity by a sovereign borrower in its
landmark decision. Almost certainly, however, the prior consent of the
borrower to an eventual attachment of his assets in France constitutes
another exception derogating the principle of immunity from attach-
ment. 130 The rules in effect in this respect before the French Supreme
Court decision came into existence still apply. Those rules provide that
an express waiver of immunity is not required for the attachment of the
assets of a sovereign in France. French courts have always rules, however,
that the consent of the respective sovereign must have been given un-
equivocally and unambiguously to the exclusion of all implications either
in fact or in law.
It has thus been held, 131 for example, that when a sovereign signed an
arbitration clause the signature did not, by itself, imply a waiver of im-
munity from attachment or execution. Such implication was even denied
in a case 132 where a sovereign had adhered to an arbitration under the
Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris. Those rules provide in article 24 paragraph (2): "By
submitting the dispute to arbitration by the International Chamber of
Commerce, the parties shall be deemed to have undertaken to carry out
tefois, elle peut dtre exceptionnellement 6cart~e; qu'il en est ainsi Iorsque le bien saisi a
dtd affectd l'activitd 6conomique ou commerciale relevant du droit priv6 qui donne lieu A
la demande en justice." Judgment of Mar. 14, 1984, Cass. Civ. Ire, 111 J. DR. INT'L 598,
599 note B. Oppetit.
129. See also B. Oppetit, supra note 125, at 602-03; Synvet, supra note 124, at 880, 881.
130. Synvet, supra note 124, at 879, 880.
131. See Judgment of July 6, 1970, Trib. gr. inst. de Paris, 98 J. DR. INT'L 131 note P.
Kahn. The court ruled, however, that the signature of an arbitration clause implied a waiver
of immunity from suit.
132. Judgment of Apr. 21, 1982, Cour d'appel de Paris, Ire chambre A., 110 J. DR. INT'L
145, 149 note B. Oppetit.
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the resulting award without delay and to have waived their right to any
form of appeal insofar as such waiver can validly be made."
4. Federal Republic of Germany 133
The Federal Republic has no statute on state immunity either. Never-
theless, the Federal Constitutional Court has rendered two important
decisions defining the rules on immunity from attachment and execution,
one in 1977 and another one in 1983.134 In 1977 the Federal Constitu-
tional Court held that there would be no general rule in the law of
nations which would prohibit the attachment of the property of a foreign
sovereign located within the confines of the attaching jurisdiction. 135 On
the contrary, public international law would, in principle, permit such
attachment. With respect to certain objects in the possession of the
debtor state, however, an exception would have to be made to the
principle of the general permissibility of attachments. The seizure of
objects, for example, which, while in the possession of the foreign state,
would be used by it for the performance of its sovereign functions would
thus violate the laws of nations. The old principle of ne impediatur
legatio would preclude all attachments jeopardizing any sovereign action
of the debtor state. A bank account held in the name of a foreign
embassy and destined to finance its diplomatic activities, would therefore
be immune from attachment.
In 1983136 the Federal Constitutional Court further specified the ex-
ceptions permitting the attachment of the assets of a foreign sovereign.
The court ruled that bank accounts established in the name of foreign
state-owned enterprises would have to be considered as the property of
such enterprises and not as the property of the foreign states controlling
those enterprises. The attachment of such bank accounts would therefore
be permissible notwithstanding the assignment of these accounts for the
transmission to and for the use by the central banks of the foreign con-
133. See also Brandon, Immunity from Attachment and Execution, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
July 1982, at 34-35; de Smedt, Sovereign Immunity in Switzerland and Germany, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., May 1983, at 21-23.
134. Pursuant to art. 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, the general
rules of international law are a constituent part of German law and enjoy precedence over
the domestic laws of Germany in directly creating rights and duties for the inhabitants of
the federal territory. This is why the Federal Court had to carefully query, in its decisions,
whether there was any rule of public international law relating to the attachment of assets
of a foreign sovereign.
135. Judgment of Dec. 13, 1977, 46 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 342. As to the meaning of this decision, see Seidl-Hohenveldern, State Immunity:
Federal Republic of Germany, 10 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 55 (1979); Seidl-Hohen-
veldern, Neae Entwicklungen im Recht der Staatenimmunitat, in FESTSCHRiFr FUR GUNTHER
BEITZKE 1081 (0. Sandrock ed. 1979).
136. Judgment of Apr. 12, 1983, 64 BVerfGE 2.
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trolling states in the performance of their sovereign functions. The at-
tachment of such bank accounts was therefore held not to be in violation
of public international or of domestic German law.
Both decisions also allow any attachment that is grounded upon prior
consent of the debtor state. The Federal Constitutional Court is silent as
to whether such consent would have to be made in express terms or
whether it could be implied, in fact or in law, from the documents origi-
nating the debt or from the circumstances. Articles and treatises on the
law of nations have stressed, however, that such consent would have to
be unequivocal and unambiguous. 137
5. Other Countries
In its two decisions the German Federal Constitutional Court has given
a concise comparative survey over the laws regarding immunity from
attachment of many other Western countries. 138 Scrutiny of those other
national laws often reveals that doubts as to the limits of sovereign im-
munity exist and that an unequivocal and unambiguous waiver of im-
munity is the only means to escape those uncertainties.
In the European Convention on State Immunity of May 16, 1972139 a
similar policy commends itself. This Convention has been ratified by
Austria, 140 Belgium, 14 1 Cyprus, 142 Great Britain, 143 Switzerland,144 and
the Netherlands.145 The Federal Republic of Germany, 146 Luxembourg,
and Portugal have signed it. Its article 23 provides: "No measures of
execution or preventive measures against the property of a Contracting
State may be taken in the territory of another Contracting State except
where and to the extent that the State has expressly consented thereto in
writing in any particular case." (Emphasis added.)
137. Habscheid, Die Immunitat auslandischer Staaten nach deutschem Zivilprozessrecht,
in 8 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FUR VOLKERRECHT 159, 219 (1968); Berber,
In Dubio pro Immunitate, in LEHRBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 123 (2d ed. 1975).
138. For similar surveys by other authors, see Brandon, Immunity from Attachment and
Execution, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1982, at 32; de Smedt, Sovereign Immunity in Swit-
zerland and Germany, INT'L FIN. L. REV., May 1983, at 20; P. WOOD, supra note l, at
97-98.
139. The text of the Convention is reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 470 (1972) and in G.
DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES







146. Where its ratification is imminent.
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B. CONCLUSION: A STRONG RECOMMENDATION FOR AN EXPRESS
WAIVER; OBSTACLES TO ITS DECLARATION AND ITS VALIDITY
The foregoing survey strongly compels the lender in an international
loan to require an express waiver of immunity from his foreign sovereign
borrower. Otherwise, a lender may never be assured that he can avail
himself of a prejudgment attachment or of similar injunctive relief. Pro-
posals have been made for the wording of such waiver clauses.147 One
of those proposals that has been drafted particularly carefully provides:
The Borrower hereby irrevocably and unconditionally waives any right to claim
immunity (whether characterized as sovereign immunity or otherwise) in respect
of itself or any of its property or assets, including immunity from jurisdiction,
immunity from attachment prior to entry of judgment, immunity from attach-
ment in aid of execution ofjudgment, and immunity from execution ofjudgment,
all in respect of any legal suit, action, or proceeding arising out of or relating
to this Agreement. In addition, the Borrower hereby agrees that any such suit,
action, or proceeding may be instituted in the courts of the State of New York
or the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and
irrevocably and unconditionally submits to the jurisdiction of any such court
for such purpose. 1
4 8
Serious obstacles on the part of the sovereign borrower might prevent
him from issuing any declaration of this kind. Likewise he eventually
might argue the nullity of such declaration if he enunciated it in contraven-
tion to such bar. The Calvo doctrine, of widespread importance in Latin
America, is the most famous of such bars. 149 The legal implications arising
from constitutional prescriptions of that kind also deserve the careful
attention of the parties to an international loan agreement.
147. See, e.g., W. John, Sovereign Immunity, in SOVEREIGN BORROWERS 153-54 (L.
Kalder6n & Q. Siddiqi ed. 1984).
148. See Kahale, Restrictions on Waivers of Inmunity and Submissions to Jurisdiction,
37 Bus. LAW. 1549 (1982).
149. Id. at 1554; Leavy, The Calvo Doctrine in Latin American Loans, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Oct. 1985, at 31-34; Cardenas, Argentina Before Foreign Courts, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
Apr. 1984, at 22-25.
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